3 September
Today was not a good day in the history of the British Empire. In 1783, the colonies on the East Coast of North America between Canada and Mexico had proved far too expensive to retain, and Britain could no longer justify throwing good money after bad, so on this day in 1783, Britain signed the admission that the British Empire had been defeated by the group in those former colonies called either rebels or patriots, depending on who was doing the calling.
In 1939, Chamberlain declared war on Germany, a declaration that ultimately destroyed what was left of the British Empire, an Empire that once covered one quarter of the globe.
From the end of World War II until the late 1980s, most of what was in the history books about World War II was based on the Churchill histories and analysis, which are about 80% correct. World leaders, of course, concentrate on the lessons proffered by the remaining 20%.
Churchill’s version is that:
1. In 1933, Hitler came to power in Germany on a platform of racism and militarism. He promised rebuild the German military and to destroy the Jews and the Slavs. Hitler’s statements in defiance of several treaties signed in 1919 and during the 20s provided ample justification for Britain unilaterally engineering regime change, which, in 1933, could have averted World War II without any bloodshed.
2. By 1935, Hitler had begun to rebuild the German military, but a British police action to unilaterally engineer regime change would have involved a small amount of bloodshed, and would have saved far more lives than were to be lost because Britain continued to ignore the Nazis.
3. Had Britain joined with Czechoslovakia in 1938, the war with Germany would have been bloody and difficult, but British victory would never have been in doubt.
4. When, finally, Britain declared war in 1939, Britain avoided having the Swastika flying over the Houses of Parliament only by a series of miracles.
5. Finally, had Britain delayed any longer, even divine intervention could not have prevented the Nazis from subjugating Britain as completely as they subjugated Poland and France.
Churchill’s analysis of ’33 and ’35 cannot be disputed: Britain squandered the opportunity to prevent World War II at very little cost.
That, after declaring war in ’39, Britain only survived by a sequence of miracles, beginning with Dunkirk, is also not in doubt.
But Churchill’s analysis of Chamberlain’s attempt to avoid war in ’38 was completely wrong, and Churchill’s maintaining that things would have been far worse had Britain continued to delay is in doubt. And it is these two analyses that have driven US foreign policy since Churchill wrote them.
Churchill, of course, drew a straight line from 1933 to 1939 and beyond, when the history was not at all linear.
Chamberlain’s reputation suffered because he was unfortunate enough to die while still silenced by security concerns. In ’38, most Europeans believed another war could completely de-populate Europe. The European air forces were supposed to have chemical weapons with all the power now known to belong to the neutron bomb: chemicals dropped from aircraft that could completely de-populate every European city, chemicals that could not be stopped by gas masks or air raid shelters.
So, while Chamberlain was promising appeasement, he was installing the world’s most advanced air defence system. Churchill gave credit to the RAF and carrots, but none to Chamberlain, who was no longer around to defend his legacy. Without the radar shield, the Luftwaffe would have arrived at times and places that could not have been anticipated, completed their bombing runs before the RAF could have been scrambled, and returned to Nazi airfields having incurred minimal losses.
In the event, every Luftwaffe air raid resulted in losses that were more than the German economy could replace, so Hitler was forced to abandon his campaign against Britain, and turned East years before his planners said Germany would be ready.
As Waugh wrote in 1953, had Britain gone to war in 1938, it would have been at the wrong time, at the wrong place, with the wrong allies, and for the wrong reasons.
In the late 1980s, some really bad writers (I cannot bring myself to call them historians) claimed that Churchill was completely wrong, that the Jews and Slavs had killed themselves in internal conflicts. If the Nazis killed any Jews or Slavs, it was strictly in self-defence, and Hitler’s racism was completely justified by the sub-human nature of the Jews and Slavs.
The really bad analysis and attempt to deny the Nazi crimes obscures a position that cannot be resolved. Legitimate historians have established that Hitler’s plan, had Britain not declared war, was to annex the primarily German Western areas of Poland, while the USSR annexed the primarily Slavic Eastern areas. Once West Poland was fully digested, the German plan was to implement Operation Barbarossa, beginning in 1943, an Operation intended to destroy the USSR, and turn all of Slavic Europe into German lebensraum.
Churchill was aware of this, but maintained that, after Barbarossa, the Nazis would have been so powerful that no nation on earth would have been able to prevent them from achieving total world conquest.
The unanswerable question is whether Churchill was correct about this. It is possible that, after the planned 1943 Barbarossa War, the winner would have been so debilitated that an Allied victory would have been easy, and Britain could have kept its Empire. Or at least dismantled its Empire in a way that caused fewer problems.
So it is clear that Churchill was correct about appeasement in ‘33 and ‘35, before it was called appeasement.
It is also clear that Churchill was not correct about appeasement in ‘38, and that Chamberlain was wrongly condemned for delaying the war until the air defence shield was in place.
What is not at all clear is whether Chamberlain should have been condemned for declaring war on this day in 1939.
In 1939, Chamberlain declared war on Germany, a declaration that ultimately destroyed what was left of the British Empire, an Empire that once covered one quarter of the globe.
From the end of World War II until the late 1980s, most of what was in the history books about World War II was based on the Churchill histories and analysis, which are about 80% correct. World leaders, of course, concentrate on the lessons proffered by the remaining 20%.
Churchill’s version is that:
1. In 1933, Hitler came to power in Germany on a platform of racism and militarism. He promised rebuild the German military and to destroy the Jews and the Slavs. Hitler’s statements in defiance of several treaties signed in 1919 and during the 20s provided ample justification for Britain unilaterally engineering regime change, which, in 1933, could have averted World War II without any bloodshed.
2. By 1935, Hitler had begun to rebuild the German military, but a British police action to unilaterally engineer regime change would have involved a small amount of bloodshed, and would have saved far more lives than were to be lost because Britain continued to ignore the Nazis.
3. Had Britain joined with Czechoslovakia in 1938, the war with Germany would have been bloody and difficult, but British victory would never have been in doubt.
4. When, finally, Britain declared war in 1939, Britain avoided having the Swastika flying over the Houses of Parliament only by a series of miracles.
5. Finally, had Britain delayed any longer, even divine intervention could not have prevented the Nazis from subjugating Britain as completely as they subjugated Poland and France.
Churchill’s analysis of ’33 and ’35 cannot be disputed: Britain squandered the opportunity to prevent World War II at very little cost.
That, after declaring war in ’39, Britain only survived by a sequence of miracles, beginning with Dunkirk, is also not in doubt.
But Churchill’s analysis of Chamberlain’s attempt to avoid war in ’38 was completely wrong, and Churchill’s maintaining that things would have been far worse had Britain continued to delay is in doubt. And it is these two analyses that have driven US foreign policy since Churchill wrote them.
Churchill, of course, drew a straight line from 1933 to 1939 and beyond, when the history was not at all linear.
Chamberlain’s reputation suffered because he was unfortunate enough to die while still silenced by security concerns. In ’38, most Europeans believed another war could completely de-populate Europe. The European air forces were supposed to have chemical weapons with all the power now known to belong to the neutron bomb: chemicals dropped from aircraft that could completely de-populate every European city, chemicals that could not be stopped by gas masks or air raid shelters.
So, while Chamberlain was promising appeasement, he was installing the world’s most advanced air defence system. Churchill gave credit to the RAF and carrots, but none to Chamberlain, who was no longer around to defend his legacy. Without the radar shield, the Luftwaffe would have arrived at times and places that could not have been anticipated, completed their bombing runs before the RAF could have been scrambled, and returned to Nazi airfields having incurred minimal losses.
In the event, every Luftwaffe air raid resulted in losses that were more than the German economy could replace, so Hitler was forced to abandon his campaign against Britain, and turned East years before his planners said Germany would be ready.
As Waugh wrote in 1953, had Britain gone to war in 1938, it would have been at the wrong time, at the wrong place, with the wrong allies, and for the wrong reasons.
In the late 1980s, some really bad writers (I cannot bring myself to call them historians) claimed that Churchill was completely wrong, that the Jews and Slavs had killed themselves in internal conflicts. If the Nazis killed any Jews or Slavs, it was strictly in self-defence, and Hitler’s racism was completely justified by the sub-human nature of the Jews and Slavs.
The really bad analysis and attempt to deny the Nazi crimes obscures a position that cannot be resolved. Legitimate historians have established that Hitler’s plan, had Britain not declared war, was to annex the primarily German Western areas of Poland, while the USSR annexed the primarily Slavic Eastern areas. Once West Poland was fully digested, the German plan was to implement Operation Barbarossa, beginning in 1943, an Operation intended to destroy the USSR, and turn all of Slavic Europe into German lebensraum.
Churchill was aware of this, but maintained that, after Barbarossa, the Nazis would have been so powerful that no nation on earth would have been able to prevent them from achieving total world conquest.
The unanswerable question is whether Churchill was correct about this. It is possible that, after the planned 1943 Barbarossa War, the winner would have been so debilitated that an Allied victory would have been easy, and Britain could have kept its Empire. Or at least dismantled its Empire in a way that caused fewer problems.
So it is clear that Churchill was correct about appeasement in ‘33 and ‘35, before it was called appeasement.
It is also clear that Churchill was not correct about appeasement in ‘38, and that Chamberlain was wrongly condemned for delaying the war until the air defence shield was in place.
What is not at all clear is whether Chamberlain should have been condemned for declaring war on this day in 1939.
posted by Dubai@Random at 10:13 pm
1 Comments:
Just to point out a couple of problems with your theory (and I'm sure that there are others):
1) Chamberlain, from every account at the time of Munich believed, not that he had bought England enough time to rearm, but that he had permanently avoided the war and that Hitler would now turn on the Soviets.
2) While it is true that the British did slowly increase their rate of re-arming after Munich (and only at the urging of people like Churchill, as Chamberlain dragged his feet as much as he could), they were still falling further behind the Germans every day. And still the Germans weren't even ready for the war in 1939, much less in 1938. At that time, the French had the Germans hopelessly outnumbered on the Western front. If they had launched an invasion while the Germans were tied up in Poland, the Germans would have lost then.
3) The British (and the French, who deserve a lot more blame than they get for Munich) not only threw away the chance to fight a two front war with the Czechs on their side, a war that even the German generals thought that the Allies would win easily, but told everyone that their word was no good. The Belgians withdrew from defence treaties after Munich, which severely damaged the Western defence.
4) If Chamberlain was stalling for time, he certainly didn't act like it. A statesman who was stalling for time would not have come back waving his worthless scrap of paper and claiming "Peace in our time" - he would have been warning of the peril that still existed. He would have used Churchill, Duff Cooper, Eden, etc, to help rouse the country to the danger that he foresaw. Instead, Chamberlain did everything he could to keep those men off the BBC and out of the paper.
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